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Introduction 
In the Inaugural Address to the Royal Statistical Society in 1960, M.G. 
Kendall wrote that Pareto’s law of the distribution of incomes was “the first 
notable law” in the economic and social field “to be written down mathe-
maticcally and checked against observation”2. Numerous authors before 
Pareto had suggested the existence of universal laws in human society ana-
logous to those of nature: nonetheless no one before him had managed to 
propose a rigorous mathematical formulation supported at the same time 
by a vast empirical-statistical support. Pareto’s law therefore holds a place 
in the history of the social sciences as one of the most representative of the 
idea that society, like nature, is governed by universal laws. 
As is known, on the political and social plane, Pareto’s law has fed 
unending controversy, inherent precisely to the problem of its “univer-
sality”. On this front there have always been heated arguments for and 
against Pareto. Diversely, from the strictly statistical point of view, there 
has been major consensus on the idea that “Pareto’s law” represented a de-
cisive step in the study of the personal distribution of income and wealth, 
perhaps even the first contribution in applied econometrics. His “law of 
income” is not certainly as universal as he thought; however it has been 
shown to be a heuristic instrument of undoubted cognitive potential, which 
is furthermore efficient and still valid for describing the upper tail of the 
distribution of wealth. 
The problem of the status of Pareto’s law is nonetheless still uncertain, 
not only from the strictly historical point of view, but also from an episte-
mological standpoint: is it an “empirical” formula, a “statistical” law, a 
“social-institutional” law or a “natural” law? Those who have interpreted it 
have given highly contrasting responses to this question; even Pareto him-
self showed a certain ambiguity, assuming positions that were partly con-
tradictory. As we will argue here, however, in the author of the Cours the 
                                                          
1.– Università degli Studi di Brescia, Dipartimento di Studi sociali ; maccabel@eco.unibs.it 
2.– M.G. Kendall, “Natural Law in the Social Sciences”, p. 3. 
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idea that his “law of incomes” has sufficient universality to legitimize its 
interpretation as a natural law prevails.  
Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect is instead the absence of any inter-
pretation in a strictly “economic” sense for Pareto’s law. The invariability in 
time and space of the forms of social hierarchy – and of the consequent 
unequal distribution of wealth – is justified by Pareto basing his theory 
only in part upon arguments of an economic nature. The terrain chosen by 
the author of the Cours to explain the universal nature of his law of distri-
bution is that of anthropology. Taking from that science the anthropolo-
gical concept of social heterogeneity he poses it as the foundation of his 
own theory of distribution. This allows him to set aside, on one hand, 
albeit with some hesitation, explanations of a socio-institutional nature for 
inequality and, on the other, explanations which lead to attributing the 
distribution of income and wealth to probabilistic events of a casual nature.  
The three terms chosen for the title of this present work mirror the 
three potential causes that Pareto considers may explain his law: “nature”, 
or rather the ineluctable anthropological diversity of individuals in terms of 
capacity and aptitude; “nurture”, or the influence exercised by environ-
ment, institutions and in general by social and political organisation; and, 
finally, “chance”, that is the action of random events of a stochastic nature 
(random occurrences). Having named these three possible causes, Pareto 
openly favours the first. Despite the caution with which he invited the 
reader to examine the statistic regularities, he in fact went so far as to attri-
bute to his own law the status of a “natural” law. 
In this paper we will discuss the problem of the status of Pareto’s law 
analysing both Pareto’s thought and some moments of the intense debate 
that followed. As is known, Pareto’s law has generated vast literature, both 
on the theoretical and historical planes, which will however only partially 
be examined here. In this paper we will concentrate our attention only on 
the initial, prevalently Italian, phases of the debate on the status of Pareto’s 
law. 
The paper is organised as follows. After a presentation of the Pareto’s 
law, in which its genesis as an “empirical” or “statistical” law will be shown, 
in the second section the two interpretations most discussed towards the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth will be 
dealt with: the “naturalistic” reading, as held by Pareto himself, and the 
“socio-institutional”, advanced, amongst others, by Rodolfo Benini and 
Costantino Bresciani Turroni, and taken up later also by Arthur C. Pigou. 
The stochastic reading of Pareto’s law will instead be dealt with in the final 
part of the paper, discussing some of the most recent developments in the 
theories of the personal distribution of income: we intend in particular to 
show how the theories which have most explicitly set themselves the 
objective of explaining Pareto’s law have come to reverse the priority of 
the causes suggested by the Lausanne economist, placing the casual nature 
of the distribution process in the primary position. The most singular 
aspect of the debate on the status of Pareto’s law is therefore precisely 
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how the stochastic dimension, expressly set aside by the author of the 
Cours, has in the end been revealed as the most efficacious mode of ex-
plaining the Paretian type of distributions.  
The empirical foundations of Pareto’s law 
Are there universal “laws” that govern the distribution of honours and 
privileges in human society? And what is the specificity, in the field of 
modern market economies, of the distribution of honours and privileges 
when these take on the aspect of income and wealth? The celebrated 
income “curve” elaborated by Vilfredo Pareto at the end of the Nineteenth 
century is without doubt one of the most potent instruments ever proposed 
in the history of social sciences in the attempt to answer these questions. 
Through the work of J.S. Mill the classical tradition had left the inhe-
ritance of a compromise solution: only in the area of “production” do “uni-
versal” economic laws exist, diversely from the “distribution” front, where 
instead the historical, political and institutional conditionning appears deci-
sive. Some neoclassical economists also make reference to this compro-
mise, as, for example, L. Walras. The Lausanne economist shared in fact 
with Mill the idea that among the tasks of the economy was that of judging 
the distribution results sanctioned by the market “ethically”, arriving at 
expressly legitimizing the demand for major equity in the distribution of 
wealth.  
In succeeding to Walras in the chair at Lausanne, Pareto immediately 
manifested his intention to proceed in a totally different direction from his 
predecessor. He held that it was necessary to leave every consideration of 
an ethical character out of the analysis of the distribution phenomenon, 
judging any concept of “justice” (and in particular that posed by Walras as 
the base of his “social” economics) to be lacking in scientific foundation. In 
Pareto’s view, the problem of distribution had to be dealt with differentia-
ting the areas of “facts” and “values” in a net fashion. Thus his choice of 
dealing with the problem of distribution through a rigorously empirical-
statistical approach3, keeping scrupulously to the factual data and never 
descending to compromises with “evaluative” criteria. 
The statistical data which he had begun to collect from 1893, coinciding 
with his arrival in Lausanne4, became therefore the starting point for his 
investigation. He began to carry out statistic interpolations on this data, 
verifying the possibility of deducing empirical formula that would reveal 
                                                          
3.– The “empirical/inductive” approach further contributed to invalidate one of the most consoli-
dated prejudices against “statistics”, considered for the whole of the nineteenth century by the 
“pure” economists as an ancillary discipline to political economy, or at least as sterile from a 
theoretical point of view. It must be remembered in fact that during the XIXth century theo-
retical economists had always maintained a certain reserve towards statistics, considering it as 
knowledge which was excessively unbalanced towards facts and above all a dangerous pre-
cursor to “state interventionism” (famous in this context are the positions taken by Say or 
Ferrara). 
4.– As far as concerns France, Britain, Belgium and some German states (Prussia and Saxony), 
Pareto uses the statistical series from the first official reports on the declarations of income. In 
other cases – in particular the data which concerns some cities and countries of the past – the 
incomes are instead deduced from publications of a historical nature. 
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the presence of eventual uniformity in the area of distribution of income. 
As is known, in 1895 he expounded for the first time the celebrated “law 
which describes how citizens’ incomes are distributed”, using a symbolism 
partially different from that used in later works5.  
The most important aspect is the emphasis initially placed by Pareto on 
the concept of “empirical law”. The “law of income” is held in fact to be a 
first step in filling in one of the major lacunae in economic theory, that is 
the lack of “empirical laws” that sustain the “formulas of pure economics”. 
Although a simple statistical induction, the law of incomes presents none-
theless some singular characteristics. Above all the fact “that such a simple 
formula” offers a good approximation of the effective data. But it is “even 
more singular”, Pareto adds, that “interpolating the data” from very dissi-
milar countries we find analogous slopes to the graphs, that is with “very 
similar value for h”. These results therefore lead Pareto to advance the 
hypothesis that the phenolmenon of the distribution of wealth is regulated 
by a sort of “general law”6.  
In a successive publication in 1896, when Pareto expounded the “law of 
incomes” in a more organic fashion, this singularity is further underlined. 
Displaying the values of the incomes and the number of individuals who 
possess at least every given income on a graph with a double logarithmic 
scale7, Pareto confirms the constancy of the slope of the curve8. The idea 
merely foreshadowed in 1895, became thus more decided. That which in 
the beginning was a simple statistical regularity, began in Pareto’s eyes to 
be a real and proper “natural law”. As G.S. Sahota observes, Pareto “was so 
impressed by the results, obtained from income tax data, that he thought 
he had discovered a natural law for the stability of the inequalities of 
income”9. He writes in fact that from the statistical data “the presence of a 
natural law which reveals to us the tendency of incomes to group them-
selves in a certain manner” emerges. These results – Pareto points out – 
                                                          
5.– In 1895 Pareto proposes the formula hx
Hy = , where x represents the income and y the 
number of families having income comprised between x e dx, while H and h represent cons-
tants to find through interpolation. The values of h indicated by Pareto – which oscillate 
around 2,5 – differ from those proposed in the successive works, when the symbol h will be 
substituted by  , in that the incomes equation will no longer be formulated in terms of num-
ber of taxpayers comprised between x e dx but as number of taxpayers having at least a 
given income x. 
6.– V. Pareto, «La legge della domanda», p. 279. 
7.– As is known, Pareto’s equation takes the form LogxLogALogN α−= , from which αx
AN=  
(where x represents a certain income and N the number of taxpayers with an income equal to 
or superior to x, while A and   are the variables to be found through interpolation). 
8.– Taking further data into consideration, Pareto in fact observes, “not only do we again find that 
these points tend to arrange themselves along a straight line, but we also note that the straight 
lines thus drawn form angles which are substantially the same with the axis of the abscissa” 
(V. Pareto, La courbe de la répartition de la richesse, p. 233). 
9.– G.S. Sahota «Theories of Personal Income Distribution», p. 3. 
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“are quite remarkable”, and “it’s absolutely impossible they can be ascribed 
to chance”10. 
Pareto worked at first on an exclusively empirical plane: his “income 
curve” was in fact the result of a statistic interpolation of the limited data 
available at the time regarding the taxpayers in some European countries. 
The apparently analogous form of such a curve for the differrent countries 
taken into consideration induced him to go well beyond the simple empi-
rical plane: on more than one occasion he advanced the hypothesis that 
there is a “universal” law underlying the distribution of incomes, proven by 
the identical inclination of the curve in the different cases considered. A 
conviction further reinforced by the discovery of data concerning countries 
out with Europe, in this instance Peru, which would seem to confirm the 
universality of the law of incomes. Writing to a friend Maffeo Pantaleoni, 
Pareto proudly emphasises the point: 
“I have found a document from which it may be seen that in Peru, at the time of 
the Spanish domination, incomes were disposed according to a curve similar to 
those that I found for the civilised peoples of our own times. Thus confirming 
that that curve is the expression of a natural law11.” 
Pareto manifested also a certain caution regarding the validity of the 
laws taken exclusively from statistic induction. However his words are 
explicit: the distribution of incomes is subject to a “general” law that he 
does not hesitate to define as “natural”. The problem for Pareto at this 
point is how to explain why distribution is reproduced in human societies 
in this universal form, a task made moreover necessary by the first object-
tions that began to be raised against his “law”.  
Pareto’s law as a “law of nature”: the anthropological 
foundations 
One of the first criticisms which deals with the problem of the scientific 
status of “Pareto’s law” is that made by Edgeworth. The English economist 
commences by highlighting the fundamental “political” corollary which 
springs from Pareto’s law: if the form of distribution is analogous in all so-
cieties, there is little chance that it can be modified by social and economic 
reforms of any nature12. Edgeworth does not dwell upon this aspect, as he 
shares in substance the idea that the hierarchy of income and wealth is a 
universal fact, not easily modifiable. He discourses at length instead on the 
statistical aspects, and in particular on the problem of the efficacy of the 
formula suggested by Pareto for describing the distribution phenomena. 
He believes that the curve identified by the Italian economist cannot be 
generalised – despite its high level of conformity to the data – at least until 
its rational and theoretical foundations are made specific. 
                                                          
10.– V. Pareto, La courbe de la répartition de la richesse, p. 233-236. 
11.– Pareto to Pantaleoni, 14 July 1896, in V. Pareto, Lettere a Maffeo Pantaleoni. 1890-1925, 
p. 460-461.  
12.– “The approximate identity of the law as ascertained for different countries, point to the 
dependence of the distribution of income upon constant causes not to be easily set aside by 
hasty reformers” (F.Y. Edgeworth, «Supplementary Notes on Statistics», p. 533). 
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It appears to me […] that a close fit of a curve to given statistics is not, 
per se and apart from à priori reasons, a proof that the curve in question is 
the form proper to the matter in hand (F.Y. Edgeworth, «Supplementary 
Notes on Statistics», p. 533).  
Edgeworth objects moreover that the Paretian formula is ineffective for 
describing the lower tail of incomes, in truth ignoring the caution, so often 
repeated by Pareto, that his law had value only over a certain level of 
minimum income. In substance, Edgeworth reproves the Italian economist 
for not having used one of the formulas generally used for representing 
normal distributions, observing that authoritative statisticcians, as for exam-
ple Karl Pearson, had underlined how the probabilistic distribution of 
errors was revealing itself to be universal not only in nature but also in 
society.  
 Edgeworth’s criticism obliged Pareto to intervene to clarify his own 
ideas on the status of his “law of incomes”. He immediately declared that 
he had never confused “the empirical laws with the rational laws”. The 
problem arises from the fact that a multiplicity of causes, some of which 
are still unknown, act on the distribution of incomes and wealth. This 
makes it impossible to identify a “rational” law which contemplates all of 
these infinite causes. “It would be best to know a more precise law, but 
finally knowing that approximate law is always better than knowing 
nothing”13. Natural laws too, Pareto points out, are not “known to us in all 
their details”. Nonetheless, in the natural world, there are numerous em-
pirical regularities which can be deduced from certain simplifying hypo-
theses: in such a case we are in the presence of empirical laws that are at 
the same time rational laws. The elliptical movement of the planets obser-
ved empirically, for example, can be deduced from some axioms regarding 
the gravitation of the heavenly bodies. In the same fashion, if we assume 
that individuals are socially heterogenic, the law of incomes observed 
empirically becomes a “rational” and “natural” law. Pareto proposes in this 
context an efficacious synoptic comparison between the laws which govern 
the movement of the stars and the laws of the distribution of incomes. 
The law of the distribution of wealth is in substance compared to the 
universal law of gravitation, suggesting the idea that the sharing out of 
wealth is governed by a law equivalent to that which governs the “natural” 
movement of the stars. The key point, the element which holds up the 
entire analogy proposed by Pareto, is the existence of a hypothesis which 
can be compared to the Newtonian one of universal gravitation. In the 
opinion of the Lausanne economist such a hypothesis, or axiom, lies in the 
anthropological concept of “social heterogeneity”. It is necessary to begin 
with the concept of “social heterogeneity”, held to be a postulate analo-
gous to that of universal gravitation, therefore, in order to understand the 
motives that lead Pareto to attribute the status of “natural” law to his own 
law of incomes. 
                                                          
13.– V. Pareto, « La curva delle entrate e le osservazioni del prof. Edgeworth », p. 253. 
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Movement of the stars 
 
The curve traveled by the planets is 
very complicated. Even today it is only 
known approximately. 
 
Kepler empirically found a curve which 
is not at all that traveled by the planets, 
but which is very close, in certain cases.
 
Newton made some hypotheses 
regarding attraction from which 
Kepler’s laws follow rationally, from 
further hypotheses. 
 
Subsequent astronomers’ studies have 
shown that the law of universal gravity 
sufficed to calculate the real curves 
traveled by the planets. These curves 
are not ellipses.  
Distribution of income 
 
The income curve is very complicated. 
 
 
 
For incomes, we find, within certain 
limits, a very approximate curve. 
 
 
Some hypotheses can be made 
regarding social heterogeneity from 
which the formula found empirically for 
the incomes follows rationally. 
 
Subsequent studies will tell us whether 
that doctrine of social heterogeneity 
will suffice to explain all the 
phenomena, or else, as is more 
probable, indeed almost certain, if other 
causes should be taken into account14. 
 
The aspect worth noting is above all the shift made by Pareto from the 
economic plane to the anthropological one. In the Cours the presentation 
of the “law of incomes” does not appear in fact in the chapters dedicated 
to the general economic equilibrium but within the sphere of the so-called 
“social physiology”, as the title of the last chapter of the Cours. The “natu-
ralism” of Pareto springs from this terrain; from the fact that he rejects – or 
at least re-evaluates to a significant degree – the socio-institutional factors, 
choosing instead to focus on the “anthropological” characteristics of human 
nature. In the Cours, he recognises three potential “causes” that could 
explain the uniformity identified in the distribution of wealth: 1) “chance” 
2) social organisation; 3) the nature of man. Pareto underlines, a propos, 
that the choice between these causes must be evaluated on the sole basis 
of the empirical data, excluding the possibility of an “a priori” choice. He 
observes in fact that 
It is observation that must inform us in regard to the part that such 
causes effectively play in the sharing out of wealth. If we find that the sha-
ring out of wealth varies in a considerable measure and an irregular 
fashion then we will conclude that “chance” plays a considerable part in 
the production of this phenomenon. If the variations in the sharing out of 
wealth follow the variations of the economic organisation, it is to this orga-
nisation that we should attribute a preponderant role. If, finally, the sha-
ring out of wealth varies little by region, epoch or diverse organisations, 
then, without wishing to overlook the other causes, we must conclude that 
we should look for the principal cause that determines the phenomenon in 
the nature of man (V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, II, p. 334). 
                                                          
14.– V. Pareto, op. cit., p. 253. 
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Pareto emphasises that the empirical data reveal a substantial unifor-
mity of the distribution in different countries and epochs15. This is the 
motive for which the first two causes are set aside in favour of the last, 
which is presented in every respect as the central nucleus of the Paretian 
theory of social hierarchies. 
 As has already been said, Pareto’s argument develops around the con-
cept of “social heterogeneity”. The sources Pareto draws on in proposing 
such a concept are expressly declared: in particular he is dealing with the 
works of Otto Ammon and of Georges Vacher de Lapouge, leading expo-
nents of the so-called school of “anthroposociology”, an end of the nine-
teenth century version of social Darwinism with an explicit racial and 
eugenic orientation. Pareto will never come to explicitly take up “racial” 
and “eugenic” positions; however his social anthropology results as being 
strongly indebted to the concepts formulated by the founders of the 
discipline16.  
The idea of “social heterogeneity” constitutes one of the pillars of the 
Paretian conception of the social hierarchies. It is used in opposetion to 
the “Enlightenment” idea of equality, which Pareto reproves for having 
rooted “prejudices” that have lead to “a miscomprehension of the hetero-
geneity among the individuals of a same society”17. Human society, in fact, 
instead of being homogeneous, “is made up of elements which differ more 
or less, not only according to the very obvious characteristics such as sex, 
age, physical strength, health, etc., but also according to less observable, 
but not less important, characteristics such as intellectual qualities, morals, 
diligence, courage, etc.”18. 
For “social heterogeneity” Pareto intends in substance the fact that the 
“qualities”, the “capacities” and the “aptitudes” of people, or, more gene-
rally, the “psychological and physiological qualities” of the individuals, are 
distributed in such a way as some “possess them [….] in a more eminent 
measure than others”. From this derives the hierarchy of incomes and 
wealth, typical of all human societies, which is not due to institutional 
causes such as “the education received” or the family’s “social condition”19. 
The form of the distribution of incomes and of the wealth of a market eco-
nomy was substantially nothing less than a subset of a more general law 
regarding the distribution of abilities. 
                                                          
15.– Pareto adds in 1897 “that there is no other statistical law which is backed by so numerous 
and such similar facts as the law of income distribution” (V. Pareto, «Aggiunta allo studio 
sulla curva delle entrate», p. 269). 
16.– Pareto expressly declares that “the doctrine of social heterogeneity” is in large part drawn 
from the writings of “Ammon, Lapouge and other anthropologists” (V. Pareto, op. cit., p. 
253). 
17.– V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, p. 390. See also Manuale di economia politica, p. 90 : 
“The assertion that men are objectively equal is so absurd that it does not even merit being 
refuted. On the other hand, the subjective idea of equality of men is a fact of great impor-
tance, and one which operates powerfully to determine the change which society 
undergoes”. On the concept of social heterogeneity in Pareto, see J.J. Spengler, «Pareto on 
Population», p. 116-122. 
18.– V. Pareto, Manuale di economia politica, p. 90. 
19.– V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, II, p. 390. 
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Pareto however distanced himself from the radical interpretation in the 
racist sense of the theory of social heterogeneity given by Ammon and 
Lapouge. The author of the Cours believed in fact that the factual data on 
which the doctrine of the hierarchy of races was constructed was still 
insufficient20. Instead he underlined how the merit of the two authors lay 
in having challenged “egalitarian” prejudice and in having once more 
brought the irreducible diversity of individuals to the center of attention.  
Pareto’s social anthropology rests in substance on the fact that there are 
“innate” differences among individuals from which there cannot but derive 
the unequal distribution of wealth described by the income curve. It is in 
this sense that the attribution of the status of “natural law” to Pareto’s law 
is to be understood. Social heterogeneity is the primordial law of the hu-
man species and to those inequality of human beings per se correspond 
economic and social inequalities, which we observe among all peoples, 
from the most ancient times to the present, everywhere in the word, and 
such that this characteristic is always present. Human society my be defi-
ned as a hierarchical collectivity (V. Pareto, Manuale di économia politica, 
p. 281). 
Conceived as a simple “empirical formula”, Pareto’s income equation is 
thus transformed, first into a “statistical law” and then into a “natural law”. 
Pareto’s anthropological concepts are decisive in this passage since they 
permitted him to put flesh on the skeleton structure he found through 
statistic induction.  
The role of “nurture” in the distribution of wealth  
As we have seen, availing himself of the theories of “social heteroge-
neity” and of “social selection” – taken from the works of the two founders 
of social anthropology, Otto Ammon and Georges Vacher de Lapouge – 
Pareto argued that the social hierarchy described by the income curve did 
not reproduce anything other than the differences in origin of human 
beings. The social and economic stratification illustrated by the statistic 
was the reflection of the different “genetic” endowment of the individual in 
regard to intelligence and ability. Aware of the distinction formulated by 
Galton in the second half of the nineteenth century between “nature” and 
“nurture”21, Pareto did not hesitate to sustain the supremacy of the first 
over the second, that is of “innate qualities” over the role played by formal 
education and by the type of economic set up22. From this spring the 
strongest implications from the political point of view: no social change 
would radically upset the form of the economic hierarchies, in that these 
                                                          
20.– “Saying that there are in society men who possess certain qualities in a more eminent mea-
sure than others and saying that there is a class of men absolutely better than the rest of the 
population is already not the same thing” (V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, p. 392). 
21.– “Nature is all that a man brings with himself into the world; nurture is every influence from 
without that affects him after his birth” (cit. in J.A. Field, «The Progress of Eugenics, p. 14). 
22.– As far as concerns the idea that it is the institutional mechanisms that regulate the mode of 
sharing out income, this is excluded by Pareto in that it is contradicted by the circumstance 
that the same curve is present in the most diverse social organisations, however distant these 
are in time and space (V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, p. 344). 
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were the product of a natural law and would therefore tend to be repro-
duced even in a society organised diversely from the capitalist model. 
Pareto in fact emphasises that  
 The inequality in the sharing out of income seems therefore to depend 
much more on the nature of man itself than on the economic organisation 
of society. It may well be that profound modifications made in this organi-
sation have but little influence in the sense of modifying the law of the 
sharing out of incomes (V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, p. 404). 
Mills’ idea that distribution is a phenomenon acted on by conditioning 
which is primarily historical, political and institutional is therefore largely 
redimensioned by Pareto. At the beginning of the twentieth century, some 
of those who interpreted Pareto’s law considered that it was instead ne-
cessary to re-evaluate precisely this socio-institutional component. This was 
the direction taken princepally by some Italian economists and statisticians, 
including Rodolfo Benini and Costantino Bresciani Turroni, whose position 
would later be shared by Arthur C. Pigou. These authors attribute an indis-
putable heuristic value to Pareto’s law: yet they do not consider the natu-
ralistic explanation offered by Pareto as sufficient, even more so given that 
it was contradicted by the lack of correspondence between the form of the 
income curve and that of ability.  
This is one of the most controversial aspects of Pareto’s law historically 
speaking: In maintaining his thesis that the distribution of incomes repro-
duces the distribution of ability, the author of the Cours found himself 
facing an unexpected difficulty: if the distribution of income depended on 
the ability of the individual, it should have had a “normal” symmetrical 
form around the mean, such being the distribution of capabilities. 
Among the first to underline this discordance was Rodolfo Benini. In 
1901 the Italian demographer and statistician pointed out how the socio-
economic position of individuals as measured by income did not always 
correspond to their “aptitudes” or “capacities”. If this had been true, then 
the curve of wealth and income ought to have been distributed normally. 
“The reason for the divergence”, Benini explained, was “to be sought for in 
the judicial institution of the hereditary transmission of material goods”, 
which impeded “the free manifestation of Galton’s law of regression”. In 
particular, “the hereditary transmission of goods” allowed “many mediocri-
ties to enjoy the fruits of substantial fortunes accumulated by genial fore-
bears”, with the consequence that “the corresponddence between the divi-
sion of individuals by income and that by aptitude” resulted as “profoundly 
disturbed”23. 
Pareto admitted this anomaly, but did not consider that it compromised 
the explanation that traced the distribution of income back to individual 
aptitudes and capacities. The author takes note of Benini’s criticism, which 
he again answers using an anthropological concept, that of “social selec-
                                                          
23.– R. Benini, Principii di demografia, p. 291-292. 
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tion”24. In Pareto’s opinion, selection in human society has a “double sco-
pe”: on the one hand that of collocating the individuals on the appropriate 
level of the social hierarchy; on the other that of eliminating those inept 
and incapable subjects that could undermine the survival of the social 
aggregate25. The fundamental aspect is the role played by selection in 
designing the form of the social hierarchies: Pareto in fact avails himself of 
the selective mechanism which operates in the lower levels of society to 
explain the discrepancy between the income curve and the curve of apti-
tudes. As Benini pointed out, the latter had always been held, from Quete-
let and Galton on, to be a “normal” curve, symmetrical in respect to the 
median and modal value. The income curve, diversely, presented strong 
asymmetry, which Pareto tried to justify using, precisely, the theory of 
selection. 
Pareto recognises that the income curve is not symmetrical around the 
mean: “the upper part” results as “very elongated” and the lower part 
“quite compressed”, thus asymmetrical in respect to the upper. But “from 
this simple consideration one cannot conclude that there is no symmetry in 
the qualities of the individuals who deviate equally from the mean”. What 
makes the distribution of income asymmetric is the fact that there is a limit 
towards the bottom beyond which it is not possible to descend, a limit 
which is absent from the upper part of the scale. “Indeed, of two indivi-
duals who deviate equally from the mean of the qualities, the one who has 
exceptional aptitudes for making money may have a very high income; but 
the one who has qualities equally different from the mean but in the nega-
tive direction, cannot, without dying, drop below the minimum income 
sufficient to sustain life26. Social selection, therefore, operates by elimina-
ting the individuals who found themselves under the minimum subsistence 
level, thus justifying the asymmetrical form of the distribution of incomes. 
Pareto’s clarifications were not considered as sufficient to settle the 
question. Costantino Bresciani Turroni and, once more, Benini, intervened 
to repeat that the anthropological explanation neglected the fundamental 
aspect of the problem. Bresciani Turroni believed in fact that the element 
which most effected the distribution was precisely the “institutional” factor, 
that is the type of social and economic organisation in the countries consi-
dered, in substance all organised on a capitalistic basis27. Bresciani Turroni 
came in this fashion to overturn one of the principal political corollaries of 
Pareto’s law: the idea that changes in the distribution of property rights 
                                                          
24.– On “natural selection”, in Pareto, see J.J Spengler, «Pareto on Population», p. 116-122 ; 
A. Macchioro, Vilfredo Pareto, p. 568-569 ; A. Legris, « La distribution des revenus chez 
Walras et Pareto : une analyse comparative », p. 512-514. 
25.– V. Pareto, Les Systèmes socialistes, p. 541. 
26.– V. Pareto, Manuale di economia politica, p. 284. 
27.– “From the figures presented by Pareto it is perhaps natural to draw the conclusion that the 
typical shape of the income curve […] is determined by the economic-private organisation of 
our society, common to all, rather than by the nature of man, and that the oscillations in the 
shape of the curve are caused by the special economic conditions in which each single eco-
nomy finds itself” (C. Bresciani Turroni, «Dell’influenza delle condizioni economiche sulla 
forma della curva dei redditi», p. 345). 
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cannot influence the distribution of incomes. Bresciani Turroni thought on 
the contrary that in a society capable of greater equality in conditions, the 
distribution would be much less unequal. Taking into account, in fact, that 
in the capitalist societies many individuals “owe their economic position to 
the institution of inheritance”, in an economy where this did not exist, 
where that is the “initial position” would be “the same for all, the shape of 
the income curve would be profoundly different from that seen today”. 
Only in an economy “without hereditary rights” can the distribution of 
material goods come about “according to the ‘yield of each’”, realising an 
income curve “similar to the aptitude curve”28. Bresciani Turroni’s conclu-
sion not only contrasts the supposed “universalism” of the law formulated 
by Pareto but also summarises in a few lines the principal implication of 
the question, that is the role exercised by heredity and by the “initial 
position of the individuals” in generating a given distribution of income29. 
In 1906 Benini too returned to his criticism, contesting the two prin-
cipal conclusions that Pareto reached: one the one hand the inference that 
even in a different social organisation “the sharing out of goods could not 
differ from that which it is today”; on the other, the idea that inequality 
and the consequent form of the curve are the exclusive outcome of the 
“diverse qualities or physical, intellectual and moral gifts” of individuals30. 
Benini clarifies that even if the data collected by Pareto reveal “the cha-
racteristic constant form of the sharing out of incomes”, it is still necessary 
to find out whether there is “some common antecedent to the cases obser-
ved”, in order to evaluate whether “the cause of the phenomenon” is 
“wholly or only partially” attributable to the diversity in aptitudes: 
The investigation is even more justified, in as much as the division of 
individuals by physical, intellectual gifts, etc., seems to follow the law of 
accidental errors; therefore if it were the only cause of the division of 
wealth, its curve, instead of being hyperbolic, would appear as binomial. 
What might be the other common antecedent to the cases observed? It 
could be the hereditary succession of goods, which in fact exists with very 
few differences in the diverse countries observed; to it must be principally 
prescribed the reason why many individuals of inferior aptitude manage to 
maintain themselves on a high level of the scale of wealth and others of a 
superior aptitude do not manage, save in exceptional cases, to rise above a 
golden mean of income. The hyperbolic curve of total incomes would the-
refore result from a deformation of the binomial curve, due to the distur-
batory element of the hereditary transmission of material goods. Therefore 
once again, in a hypothetical collectivist society which suppressed the he-
                                                          
28.– C. Bresciani Turroni, «Dell’influenza delle condizioni economiche sulla forma della curva dei 
redditi», p. 349. 
29.– “[…] Many men whose aptitudes would enable them to enjoy an average income, are instead 
rejected and confined to the lower classes of income; while others, whose aptitudes would 
allow them to claim but an average or small income, are instead elevated by hereditary right 
into the upper classes” (C. Bresciani Turroni, «Dell’influenza delle condizioni economiche 
sulla forma della curva dei redditi», p. 346). 
30.– R. Benini, Principii di statistica metodologica, p. 309. 
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reditary regime, the division of individuals by wealth would not maintain 
its actual form, but would be more likely to follow the known law of errors 
(R. Benini, Principii di statistica metodologica, p. 310). 
As has been seen, the comments by Benini and by Bresciani Turroni 
tend to re-evaluate the influence of the economic-social organisation on the 
distribution of income, redimensioning the naturalistic interpretation offe-
red by Pareto31. Whether these criticisms were accepted by the author of 
the Cours is still controversial. It is nonetheless a fact that in the Manuale 
there is a decidedly less categorical tone in respect to that in the Cours in 
regard to the universality and the invariability of the “curve”. In the Ma-
nuale Pareto seems indeed to have greater hesitation than in the Cours 
regarding the universality of his own law, recognising that it principally 
concerns capitalist societies32. Thus, the role of “nurture” – institutions, 
economic set up, social setting – is not excluded at all by Pareto. On the 
whole, however, he continues to reevaluate its importance, preferring to 
focus on the “natural” distribution of abilities as a factor from which the 
distribution of incomes depends in a decisive fashion. The institution of 
inheritance, for example, at times permits degenerate descendents to occu-
py social positions for which they are inadequate. However, the opinion of 
Pareto is that a healthy social organism will only allow the “chosen few” of 
the lower classes to take the place of the “degenerate” of the upper classes 
and that this movement can take place even when, in terms of material 
wealth, the initial condition of the classes is vastly different. 
Concluding remarks: the Pareto’s heritage  
The questions raised by Pareto are still at the center of the theoretical 
debate, even when his name is not expressly evoked. His lucid listing of 
the three possible causes to which the distribution of income may be attri-
buted – nature, nurture and chance – seems to perfectly outline the actual 
state of the debate. In 1978, Gian Singh Sahota wrote a famous survey on 
the theories of personal income distribution. His comprehensive taxonomy 
of the diverse theories33 anticipates at several points the questions discus-
sed in this paper.  
                                                          
31.– Benini and Bresciani Turroni’s theses would also be later taken up by Pigou. The English 
economist “conjectured that the observed discrepancy between the distribution of abilities 
and incomes was due to a skewed distribution of inherited wealth and the existence of 
‘noncompeting groups’” (G.S. Sahota, «Theories of Personal Income Distribution», p. 3). 
32.– “The data we have for determining the form of the curve […] refer principally to the 19th 
century and to civilizes peoples; consequently the conclusions drawn from then cannot be 
applied outside these limits. But it is possible, as more or less probable inference, that in 
other times and among other peoples a form fairly similar to what we find today can be 
obtained” (V. Pareto, Manuale di economia politica, p. 289). See also the letter to Maffeo 
Pantaleoni dated 28th October 1896, where Pareto writes: “I myself have indicated to G. 
Sorel one of the objections that the socialists might make: this lies in saying that that is the 
curve of the ‘capitalist’ societies. I believe that there is some truth in it and that it would be 
useful to pursue the question to the end” (V. Pareto, Lettere a Maffeo Pantaleoni,  I, p. 475-
476). 
33.– Ability theory; stochastic theory; individual choice theory; human capital theory; theory of 
educational inequalities; inheritance theory; life-cycle theory; public income redistribution 
theories; more complete theory; theory of distributive justice. 
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The first approach considered by Sahota is that known as “ability theo-
ry”, within which Pareto’s theory of distribution has a prominent role. One 
of the major difficulties encountered by this approach has been, as we 
have already said, the difficulty in reconciling the form of the distribution 
of ability with the distribution of income. In underlining the asymmetry of 
the distribution of income, Pareto had realised the discrepancy with the 
normal distribution of ability and to justify such discrepancy he availed 
himself of the concept of “social selection”, inspired by the work of social 
anthropologists like Otto Ammon34. “Since then economists have been en-
gaged in reconciling and explaining the discrepancy between the distribu-
tion of abilities and incomes, and their research has been the source of 
many theories”35. Prominent among these theories is that proposed by 
Pigou, drawn on even after the Second World War36, according to which 
the divergence between the two distributions was to be attributed to the 
highly unequal hereditary transmission of wealth. From this standpoint, 
Pigou literally adopts arguments amply debated in Italy by authors such as 
Benini e Bresciani Turroni. Their comments on Pareto’s law have moreover 
been shown to be fruitful in the sphere of a further theoretical approach: 
“inheritance theory”. Authors like Meade or Thurow, for example, have 
underlined how “inherited wealth remains a significant factor of income 
inequality, especially at the upper tail”37. Without any doubt, from this 
prospective, there is an emphasis on the political and social institutions as 
determining forces in distribution that harks back to Mill’s concept, which 
was instead strongly opposed by Pareto. The contrast naturally concerns 
precisely the evaluation of the naturalness of the distribution phenomenon, 
which the institutional approaches tend to trace to the social conventions 
that underpin human society rather than to any supposed universal law. 
Initially disregarded, in the course of the twentieth century stochastic 
theory came to be one of the most popular theories of the personal dis-
tribution of income. And it is singular that precisely the cause to which 
Pareto gave least credit has in fact shown itself to be the most fertile in 
developments. The author of the Cours had in fact excluded “chance” as a 
foundation for the explanation of the distribution of incomes. The exclu-
sion of “chance” rests on the diverse nature of the income curve and the 
casual curve of errors, a divergence that Pareto demonstrates in the mathe-
matical note to paragraph 87 of the Cours38. The modern stochastic 
approach in the theories of distribution has instead re-evaluated precisely 
the chance component, tracing the principal force that generates stable and 
                                                          
34.– Pareto and Ammon are frequently associated for having first highlighted “that the distribution 
of incomes is strongly skewed” (H. Saehle, « Ability, Wages, and Income », p. 77; S. Laber-
gott, « The Shape of the Income Distribution », p. 328). 
35.– G.S. Sahota, « Theories of Personal Income Distribution », p. 3. 
36.– Amongst others, H.P. Miller, Income of the American People. 
37.– G.S. Sahota, « Theories of Personal Income Distribution », p. 24. 
38.– V. Pareto, Cours d’économie politique, p. 348. See H. Staehle «Ability, Wages, and Income», 
p. 78 – “When Pareto said that his results did not depend on mere chance, he really meant 
that the distribution of incomes had nothing whatsoever to do with either the normal curve 
or any of its skewed variants” – and M. Corsi, Le disuguaglianze economiche, p. 65-70.  
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regular distribution of income and/or wealth back to probabilistic 
“chance”39. “The gist of this theory is that even if a generation started from 
a state of strict equality of incomes and wealth, inequalities of the degree 
of Pareto distribution could emerge due to stochastic forces”40. This could 
appear as a response to the objections raised by Bresciani Turroni, who 
had criticised the interpretation of Pareto’s law as a natural law, disa-
greeing precisely with the idea that from an original state of equal distri-
bution of endowment there would ensue a final distribution of the Paretian 
type. Nonetheless there remains an irremediable contrast between Pareto’s 
theories and modern stochastic theories: these postulate homogeneity 
among individuals from the point of view of their capacities and abilities, 
which is as divergent from the ideas of the author of the Cours as it is 
possible to get. “Thus, in all the present models which can explain the 
empirical Pareto wealth distribution the only reason for inequality is the 
stochastic process – chance – and homogeneous talent is a necessary con-
dition if a stochastic wealth accumulation process is to lead to the Pareto 
distribution”41. In substance it is difficult to maintain that the stochastic 
theories have gathered Pareto’s legacy from the point of view of the way in 
which they deal with the question of the distribution of income. In the 
reconstruction proposed in this paper, we have highlyghted the multiform 
levels on which Pareto’s reasoning developed and his unitary conception 
of the social sciences. In the stochastic approaches, there is indeed the 
tendency to separate the economic-statistic component of his “law of in-
comes” from its anthropological and sociological frame, although they form 
part of a single whole.  
The approach which seems to have inherited something from Pareto  
– albeit not in direct measure – is instead that of human capital. While not 
always made explicit, there is undoubtedly an analogy in the way in which 
the major exponents of the theory of human capital deal with the distri-
butive question, in which forces traceable to “nature” rather than “nurture” 
emerge as central once more. “The development of the modern theory of 
human capital […] has all but obscured the ability basis of income inequa-
lities” and “in their models innate ability has been replaced by acquired 
human capital as the source of competency”42. The emphasis on the fact 
that the human capital is an “acquired” rather than innate factor would 
seem to place the process of economic differentiation among individuals 
within the compass of nurture rather than that of nature. However the 
major theoreticians of human capital have shown themselves to be loath to 
consider the distribution of income as a fact that can be manipulated by 
the social and political institutions, placing themselves – perhaps more 
                                                          
39.– Among the principal models that explain Pareto’s distribution based on a stochastic ap-
proach, see those by D.G. Champernowne, « A Model of Income Distribution », p. 318-351; 
H. Wold, P. White, « A Model Explaining the Pareto Distribution of Wealth », p. 591-595, and 
H.A. Simon, « On a Class of a Skew Distribution Function », p. 425-440.  
40.– G.S. Sahota, « Theories of Personal Income Distribution », p. 7. 
41.– S. Levy, H. Levy, Investment Talent and the Pareto Wealth Distribution, p. 2. 
42.– G.S. Sahota, « Theories of Personal Income Distribution », p. 3-4. 
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from an ideological point of view than a theoretical one – in strict continui-
ty with the theory held by the author of the Cours.  
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